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Abstract—  In developing countries, modern 
production contracts offered by supermarkets or agro-
export firms entail a loan component under the form of 
input advances. Like traditional moneylenders, 
supermarkets want to make sure that this investment is 
not diverted. However, unlike moneylenders, 
supermarkets do care about the attributes of the 
product (form, quality, food safety, etc.). Whether such 
attributes are present in the harvested product is largely 
influenced by the advice and the extension services 
received by the farmer. We built a financial contracting 
model where we show that supermarkets, choosing to 
forgo specialization, optimally delegate to a multi-
tasking agent both the monitoring and the advisory 
missions. This contract is shown to potentially enhance 
credit access for small farmers and sometimes to involve 
excessive monitoring.  
 
Keywords—  Food Standards, Organization of 
Production, Supermarket. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In the last two decades, we have witnessed an 
impressive development of supermarket chains in 
developing countries. Saturation and intense 
competition in retail markets of developed countries, 
together with substantial margins offered by investing 
in developing markets, have largely contributed to the 
emergence of supermarket chains. In countries where 
a substantial portion of the population lives in rural 
areas, the rise of supermarkets, that arguably affect the 
livelihood of farmers, is a sensitive issue. 
Since public food quality standards are often 
inadequate and lack proper enforcement in developing 
countries. Supermarkets have to develop their own 
standards. This requires the creation of vertical 
relationships with growers through the establishment 
of tighter procurement contracts. Although the specific 
form of the contractual relationship between the 
grower and the supermarket can vary greatly 
depending on the context, there are arguably common 
denominators. 
Typically, supermarkets require their growers to 
make a substantial up-front investment into their 
operations. In addition supermarkets are playing new 
roles in the production process. These roles essentially 
consist of a combination of intense production 
monitoring and advising. Finally, supermarkets extend 
loans in the form of input advances that are 
reimbursed later when the crop is sold. 
Interestingly the analysis of this change in the 
procurement system has mainly remained descriptive 
by the relevant literature and their real welfare impacts 
on growers are still controversial. On the one hand, 
many empirical studies have found that supermarkets 
tend to leave behind or exploit small growers, 
preferring to concentrate their procurement of fresh 
agricultural products on larger scale operations ([1] 
and [2]). On the other hand, recent case studies have 
somewhat challenged the view that supermarkets have 
only a negative impact on small growers. In particular, 
these studies show that in niche markets small growers 
perform remarkably well and remain an attractive 
supply source for supermarket chains ([3], [4] and 
[5]). 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to this 
debate by providing a theoretical framework to 
analyze the impact that supermarkets have on growers' 
credit access and to rationalize the observed stylized 
facts associated with the supermarkets entry. In 
particular we seek to understand why the supermarket 
not only behaves as a consultant (that provides 
production advice), but also endorses the role of 
conventional moneylenders. The literature on micro-
credit in developing countries has emphasized the role 
of moneylenders as important actors in farming areas. 
Traditionally, growers have relied on moneylenders, 
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as the latter have an informational advantage and excel 
in curbing farmers' incentives not to reimburse loans
1.  
In this paper, the relationship between the farmer 
and the supermarket is modelled through a financial 
contract. Farmers borrow the capital (e.g. production 
inputs) necessary to undertake production and later 
reimburse the lender once harvest is done. The 
contractual relationship between farmers and the 
supermarket is modelled via a framework similar in 
spirit to [9]
2. However, unlike the conventional 
financial intermediary of [9], we characterize a 
contractual framework in which the financial 
intermediary not only monitors borrowers, but also 
provides advice that enhances the value of their 
projects. 
In doing so we show that an organization in which 
supermarkets advise, extend a loan and monitor 
growers is preferred by the supermarket. In particular, 
bundling these tasks in the financial contract results in 
an organization in which motivation costs or agency 
rents are reduced. Allocating the two tasks to the 
supermarket implies that, as a monitor, the value of a 
high quality crop is increased when the probability of 
success increases as well; thus the supermarket also 
has an incentive to advise diligently. We show that 
rent contraction results in more poor growers 
obtaining loans.  
Our definition of the supermarket procurement 
process is very much similar to that of contract 
farming. Production finance by contract farming 
usually involves technical advising and monitoring. As 
described by [8], contract farming, apart from the 
advising part, is not different from traditional money 
lending. In particular, it possesses all the informal 
aspects of moneylending. However, this type of 
                                                           
1 In developing countries, credit loans extended by 
traditional moneylenders use growers' crops as collateral. 
To make sure that the grower repays his loan, the 
moneylenders closely monitor him during the crop cycle to 
make sure that he does not secretly side-sell and then 
default on their loan by pretending to have a bad harvest 
(See [6] and [7]). Unlike the advising part, the monitoring 
exerted by the supermarket is very similar to that of 
traditional moneylending (See [8] and [5] for the case of 
supermarket monitoring) 
2  For applications of this framework to developing 
countries, see, for instance, [10] that explores informal 
credit markets and [11], [12] and [13] on micro finance. 
lending has become prevalent in many developing 
countries. For instance, [8] reports that, during the last 
20 years, that production finance has become 
dominant in Chile. Our multitask approach to this type 
of contract can explain their relative superiority with 
respect to banking finance or traditional 
moneylending. 
In what follows, we first present our modeling 
framework. Then we establish the financial contract 
passed between the actors involved in the production 
of an agricultural product when the task of monitoring 
and advising are exerted by separate agents. Then we 
repeat our analysis for an organization of the 
production where the same agent exerts both tasks of 
advising and monitoring. In the next section the 
comparison of the optimal contract for each 
organization of production shows that motivation costs 
or agency rents are reduced when advising and 
monitoring are performed by the same agent. The last 
section concludes the paper. 
II. PROCUREMENT ORGANIZATION: A MODEL 
Consider a rural economy made up of a population 
of farmers, a moneylender and an agrifood sector. All 
the agents of this economy are assumed to be risk 
neutral. The agrifood sector involves a 
supermarket/exporter and a procurement agent. 
Farmers. Farmers are assumed to be heterogeneous 
in their level of financial capacity,  . The presence of 
the supermarket provides farmers with the opportunity 
to develop a production project whose success is 
stochastic. More precisely, if the project is undertaken, 
it yields a verifiable income stream of   in case 
of success and   if it fails. From the farmer's 
perspective, this project requires two inputs: his effort 




I . When the farmer 
works diligently, the probability of crop success is 
raised by  . However, diligence by the farmer is 
subject to moral hazard, as he may decide to shirk to 
enjoy a private benefit 
H p
B . In this case the farmer does 
not raise at all the likelihood of crop success. To make 
the problem non trivial, we assume that  A I > , so 
that, in order to operate farmers need to borrow 
0 > − A I  from a financial investor. 
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The moneylender. The moneylender is a member 
of the rural community, whose function is to monitor 
farmers. He has an informational advantage and it 
cannot ascertain whether the monitoring is carried out 
seriously or not. Therefore, diligent monitoring must 
be induced through contingent payments. Effective 
monitoring by the moneylender implies that he 
privately incurs a cost  . Similar to [9], the 
impact of monitoring is to reduce the farmers' 
opportunity costs of misbehaving by reducing the 
benefit of shirking to b , with  . Farmers hiring a 
moneylender can then credibly commit to diligence for 
a lower contingent payment. To make the demand for 






B− b ≥ m.
 
 
This assumption simply states that the reduction in 
the private benefit of the farmer,  , is greater than 
the private cost of monitoring, m . Under this 
assumption, it will be shown later that the 
compensation left to the moneylender to induce proper 
monitoring is less than the reduction in the farmer's 
private benefit. It is intuitive that under this 
assumption monitoring improves the feasibility of the 
crop project. 
b B−
The procurement agent. The procurement agent is 
also a member of the rural community possibly trained 
by the supermarket in delivering production advice. 
This advice helps to bring the product in conformity 
with the supermarket's specific standards. Effective 
advising from the procurement agent will raise the 
probability of success of the project by  . In other 
words, when the advisor and the farmer are both 
diligent, the probability of crop success is 
A p
H A p p + . 
The advising activity is itself subject to moral hazard, 
as the procurement agent may prefer shirking on his 
advising mission to avoid a private cost c. To 
guarantee a positive demand for service from the 
procurement agent we make the following assumption. 










This assumption implies that the value of the project 
is increased by incurring the advising motivation costs 
of the agent. Thus, whoever makes the production 
contract offer always find it optimal to hire a 
procurement agent. The procurement agent could also 
be trained by the supermarket in monitoring. Like the 
moneylender, he may decide to shirk to avoid 
incurring a private cost m . 
The supermarket. The agrifood company can 
provide  A I −  to farmers. It is a passive but rational 
investor; it extends a loan as long as it can recoup it in 
expectation. It is passive in the sense that it does not 
have the capacity to supervise borrowing farmers. As a 
result, it relies primarily on collateral-based 
enforcement of their loans. For simplicity, the 
opportunity cost of funds is normalized to 1. The 
supermarket, when accepting farmers' loan 
applications, cannot observe whether farmers will 
exert effort or not. In line with Innes [14] and all of the 
literature on financial contracting, farmers are 
assumed to be protected by limited liability; i.e. 
investors can at most seize the realized outcome. Thus, 
farmers need to make a credible commitment to the 
supermarket on their supply of effort in order for their 
loan applications to be accepted. Financing can be 
eased by using the services of a procurement agent 
(who advises farmers) and a moneylender (who 
monitors farmers). 
The agrifood company has also to decide the scope 
of its activity. The company can hire a procurement 
agent whose task is simply to advise the farmers. In 
that case, the decision to hire a moneylender is left to 
the farmer. The company can also choose to integrate 
these tasks under the same roof by hiring an agent who 
will both advise and monitor the farmers. In this 
organizational choice, the monitoring role is assumed 
by the supermarket agent and the decision to monitor 
farmers is in the hand of the supermarket. 
Finally, we make the following assumption on the 
parameters: 
ASSUMPTION 3 
maxpHR c,pAR− c  B − I  0,
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In words, the first condition states that operating the 
project with a low effort in at least one moral hazard 
dimension is ruled out. This assumption implies that, 
in equilibrium, no loan contract that gives one agent 
incentives to misbehave will be granted. The second 
condition implies that projects involving monitoring 
generate a strictly positive surplus. 
Summarizing a bit: in the crop production process, 
diligence in both advising and farming generates a 
probability   of success, but when shirking on 
advising and diligence in farming occurs (respectively, 
diligence in advising and shirking on farming occurs), 
the probability of success is then   (resp.  ). 
When shirking occurs on both tasks, crop failure is 
certain. Lastly, the purpose of monitoring is to lower 
the farmer's private benefit from 
A H p p +
H p A p
B  to b . 
The interaction between the agents described above 
is modelled as a four stage sequential game. The 
timing of events is as follows. 
Organizational choice. In the first stage, the 
supermarket decides between two types of production 
organization: one in which it hires an agent whose task 
is solely to advise the farmer on the operation and 
another in which it hires an agent not only for the 
advising but also for the monitoring tasks. In the 
former organization the farmer is free to hire or not a 
moneylender. 
Contracting. The supermarket makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to all the parties involved in the 
production cycle. More specifically, the offer is a loan 
agreement specifying a sharing rule according to 
which, in case of success, the revenue R  is divided 
among all participants. In case of failure, limited 
liability implies that all participants receive . If the 
contract is accepted, the game proceeds to investment; 
otherwise it ends at this point and all participants are 
free to consume their initial endowment. Immediately 
after the contract is signed, the farmer invests  A while 
the supermarket delivers
0
A I − . 
Effort choice. The advisor and the monitor (if one is 
involved) move first. They simultaneously decide to 
monitor (or not) and advise (or not) the farmer. The 
farmer then observes the outcome of the game and, in 
turn, decides to be diligent or not during the growth 
cycle. 
Production outcome. The production outcome is 
realized and the return of the project is shared 
according to the agreement signed at the contracting 
stage. 
The contract design problem consists in optimally 
sharing the project return, R , without destroying 
incentives for diligent behaviour by the farmer, the 
moneylender and the procurement agent. 
To understand the rationale behind the 
supermarket's choice of the production organization, 
the game is solved by backward induction. In the next 
sections, the optimal contract is systematically 
established for each potential organization of 
production; i.e. an organization where the 
moneylender monitors and the procurement agent 
advises and an organization where the procurement 
agent monitors and advises farmers. The comparison 
of the (privately) optimal contracts under alternative 
organization of production will determine the 
organization preference of the supermarket. 
III. MONITORING AND ADVISING BY SEPARATE AGENTS 
First consider an organization of production, where 
the supermarket only trains the procurement agent to 
advising and where monitoring remains in the hands 
of the moneylender. While according to Assumption 2 
farmers have always an interest in requiring the 
advises of the procurement agent, it is by no mean 
guaranteed that farmers will find optimal to hire a 
moneylender. However, for the sake of exposition we 
focus on the most general case where the four parties 
are involved in production. Furthermore in such 
procurement organization the decision to hire or not a 
moneylender remains in the hand of the farmers. 
While formulating the financial contract, the 
supermarket shares the project return with the 
moneylender, the procurement agent and the farmer. 
This optimal sharing rule can be established by 
solving the following program: 
 
( )() { } A I R p p s A H
Rs
− − + = π max   (1) 
 
, s p m f R R R R R + + + =   (2) 
 
( ) b R p R p p f A f A H + ≥ +   (3) 
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() c R p R p p p H p A H + ≥ +   (4) 
 
() m R p R p p m A m A H + ≥ +   (5) 
 
() 0 ≥ − + = A R p p U f A H f   (6) 
 
Here,  π  and   denotes the supermarket and 
farmer's expected net return from the project, 
respectively, while  ,  ,   and   denote the 
success-contingent stakes of the project obtained by 
the farmer, the moneylender, the procurement agent 
and the supermarket, respectively. Note that each 
contracting party observes the share of the project 
received by all contracting parties. 
f U
R f m R p R s R
The first constraint (2) simply indicates that the 
project return R  is divided up, among the contracting 
parties. The next three constraints (3), (4) and (5) 
denote the incentive constraints of the farmer, the 
procurement agent and moneylender. Each constraint 
requires that the agent earns at least as much from 
being diligent (i.e. produce effort for the farmer, 
advise for the procurement agent and monitor for the 
moneylender) than from shirking. Finally the last 
constraint denotes the farmer participation constraint. 
The solution of the above program provides the 
following proposition
3. 
PROPOSITION 1: In the second stage of the game, 
when monitoring and advising are performed by two 
separate agents, there exists a unique subgame 












H A am R p p I A + − − + − =  . In this subgame 
equilibrium, the optimal contract passed between the 
farmer, the procurement agent, the moneylender and 






B p p ≤
+  the farmer does not hire a 
moneylender. The procurement agent advises and 
earns  . a Φ  The supermarket captures the entire 
return of the project i.e.  0 = f U  and 
                                                           
3A formal proof of this Proposition is available upon 
request to the authors. 





A H − − − + = π . 







+ < ≤  the farmer does not hire a 
moneylender. The procurement agent advises and 
earns  . a Φ  The farmer's net return of the project 
is: 





+  while the supermarket 





A H − − − − + = + π   
•  if 
( )
a p
b p p A A
H
A H < ≤
+  the farmer hires a 










ml = Γ  
. The supermarket captures the entire return of the 
project i.e.  0 = f U  .and 
( )[ ] . I
H p
m − R pA p
A p
c
H − − = + π   







+ < ≤  the farmer hires a 











ml = Γ  . Finally the farmer receives 






+  .and the supermarket 





A H − − − − + = + π   
•  if  am A A< , farmers do not have access to credit. 
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1. The equilibrium 
net returns of the farmer and the supermarket are 
represented as a function of farmers' wealth  A. 
Figure 1 (a) Supermarket's expected net return. (b) Farmers' 
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From panel (a), it seems clear that the supermarket 
has a preference for well-capitalized farmers. 
However, this preference is clearly non monotonic. 
The farmer's freedom to hire a not a moneylender 
explains this non-monotonicity. By not hiring a 
moneylender the farmer in a sense increases the 
financial compensation necessary to guarantee its 
diligence and in turn reduces the expected return of the 
supermarket. 
As illustrated in panel (b) for farmers whose 
participation constraint is not binding, a payment must 
be made to guarantee their care. For the other famers, 
the fear to lose the investment made in the project is 
sufficient to insure their diligence. As monitoring 
reduces the private benefits of farmers, under the 
supervision of a moneylender a lower financial 
compensation has to be given to guarantee farmers' 
diligence. Thus when given a choice, farmers will 
prefer not to hire a moneylender. However, not all 
farmers are given this choice. Wealthy farmers have 
an advantage in obtaining loans, as they can bypass 
the services of the moneylender. In essence, 
monitoring allows poorer farmer to obtain credit. 
Finally, very poor farmers simply cannot access 
credit, even though according to Assumption 3, these 
projects are socially worthwhile. The existence of 
credit rationing in our context is driven by 
informational frictions. Indeed, moral hazard, together 
with limited liability, implies that agency rents have to 
be distributed to implement the project. This creates a 
wedge between the social value of the project and the 
total motivation costs that must be incurred to 
implement it. 
IV. MONITORING AND ADVISING BY THE PROCUREMENT AGENT 
Let now explore the contractual relationship in an 
organization of production where the procurement 
agent not only advises but also monitors. Unlike the 
previous case, the multitasking nature of the 
procurement agent now generates several incentive 
constraints. First, the procurement agent must be given 
reward  , such that it does not want to shirk on the 






R ≥   (7) 






R ≥   (8) 
Finally, the procurement agent can decide to shirk 
on both tasks, in which case the incentive constraint is 
written as 









≥   (9) 
Overall, the procurement agent will be diligent in 
both tasks if constraints (7), (8), and (9) hold true. 
Thus, the minimum stake consistent with the 
procurement agent diligence is 



















Furthermore with the procurement agent performing 
both monitoring and advising, production will only 
involve three agents, the procurement agent, the 
farmer and the supermarket. In this organization of 
production, the problem of the supermarket can be 
expressed as: 
 
  ( )() { } A I R p p s A H Rs − − + = π max   





































R R R R
 
 
Before we proceed, it is useful to define 
{ }







+ = , , max  and 
( )( ) H A
S
p A H I p b p c R p p A / / − − + = , that are used 
in the following result
4. 
                                                           
4Again a formal proof of this Proposition is available 
upon request to the authors. 
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 PROPOSITION 2 In the second stage of the game, 
when monitoring and advising are performed by a 
same agent, there exists a unique subgame 
equilibrium. In the second stage of the game, the 
contract proposed by the supermarket to the farmers 
and the procurement agent has the following features. 
•  if  , / A  the farmer obtains a production 
contract that stipulates monitoring and advising 
by the procurement agent. The latter earns 
expected net return 
S
a Φ . If 
S
p p c R =
ο    , the supermarket 
earns  
] I pH
() H A H p b p p A / + ≥
() c R p p A H [ b pA − − − + = / / π , 
while the farmer has no rent, i.e.  0 = f U . 
ο     , the farmer's 
net return is  
, 0 > −  while the 
supermarket's expected profit is 
()
S
am H A H A A p b p p ≥ > + /
() / + = A p b p p U H A H f
() [] ( ). A I H / p b / p c R p p A A H − − − − + = π
  
•  if  ,
A p
c S
p R ≠  then the farmer obtains a production 
contract. If 
ο     , the farmer's net 
return is  0 = f U  and the contract only 
stipulates advising by the agent who earns  
a Φ  while  A
() H A H p B p p A / + ≥
p pH () [] I p c R A − − + = / π . 
ο    , the farmer's net 
return is  0 >
() I H A H A A p B p p ≥ > + /
() / − + = B p p U A H f
() [
A . 
The contract only stipulates advising by the 
agent who earns  a Φ  while 
pH
] ( ). A / I p B H / p c R p p A A H − − − − + = π
 
ο     , the farmer's net 
return is   0 = f U . The contract stipulates 
monitoring and advising by the agent who 
earns  .
S
a Φ  The supermarket's expected profit 
is 
() H A H I p b p p A A / + ≥ >
() [ ] I R .  R p p
S
p A H − − + = π
ο     , the farmer's 
net return is  
()
S
am H A H A A p b p p ≥ > + /
() 0 / > − + = A p b p p U H A H f  
. The contract stipulates monitoring and 
advising by the agent who earns  .
S
a Φ  The 
supermarket's expected profit is 
( )[ ] ( ) . 0 / > − − − − A I p b R R H
S
p A
                  
+ = p pH π
                                        
 
•  if  
S
am A A<  , the farmer does not obtain a 
production contract, i.e.,  0 = f U  . 
Having established Propositions 1 and 2, it seems 
natural to inquire about the relative merit of both 
organizational forms in the first stage of the game. The 
next Proposition is the main result of this paper. The 
comparison of Proposition 1 and 2 provides the 
following Proposition
5. 
 PROPOSITION  3  There exists a unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium. In the first stage of the game, the 
supermarket chooses an organization of production in 
which both tasks of monitoring and advising are left to 
the procurement agent. In the second stage of the 
game, the contract proposed by the farmers is the one 
described in Proposition 2. 
Heuristically, by contracting with the same agent on 
both tasks the supermarket creates an incentive 
complementarity between the two tasks. For instance, 
it is possible that the agent derives a substantial rent 
by, say, monitoring diligently. Bundling and 
rewarding the two tasks in a single payment enhances 
incentives, in the sense that the prospect of losing this 
rent makes the agent less likely to overlook his 
advising duties. In other words, in this case, the agent 
is essentially a free advisor. Conversely, the agent 
could derive a substantial rent in advising and the fear 
of losing this (advising) rent would essentially make 
him a free monitor. Arguably, such a feedback loop 
does not exist when both tasks are performed by 
distinct agents. Such reduction in motivation rents 
allows the supermarket to capture a larger share of the 
project net return. Therefore it will always favour an 
organization of production where advising and 
monitoring are exerted by a same agent. 
 
 
5Again a formal proof of this Proposition is available 
upon request to the authors. 
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 COROLLARY 1 A procurement organization where 
both tasks of advising and monitoring are left to the 
same agent is conducive to the extension of credit to a 
larger number of farmers. 
 PROOF  As  { }









c + < +
+ , , max  it is 
straightforward that  .  am
S
am A A >
In a sense the bundling of monitoring and advising 
in the hand of the same agent, grants the supermarket 
with a comparative advantage in lending. As it can 
reduce by more motivation costs. 
Our result points to a beneficial role of 
supermarkets for farmers. However, it is important to 
note that the occurrence of such contracts results in the 
disappearance of traditional moneylenders in our 
model. In fact, as already noted by [8] in the Chilean 
context, the expansion of contract farming by 
supermarkets or agroindustrial firms has essentially 
resulted in the removal of traditional moneylending. 
COROLLARY  2  W
Figure 2 (a) Supermarket's expected net return. (b) Farmers' 







































































In the light of this theoretical finding, several recent 
puzzling empirical results may, perhaps, find a natural 
explanation. For instance, [15] who analyses 
production contracts between supermarkets and 
farmers, fails to find strong empirical support for 
monitoring by supermarkets as a means to raise farmer 
productivity. Such an observation seems consistent 




S ≠  then the 
supermarket over monitors farmers with a level of 
that  a A < <
R
finance such  A I A  . This implies a social 
lo
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 3 in the case where 
ss. 
Such supermarket's behaviour arises because 
monitoring effectively transfers a rent from the farmer 
to it and that the supermarket can now impose 
monitoring to farmers. For a small additional payment, 
the supermarket assigns the agent an additional 
monitoring task that ultimately results in (much) 
smaller incentive payments made to farmers. Here, 
monitoring is not motivated by feasibility issues, but is 
just a socially costly rent extraction mechanism. 
H H A H A p m p p c m p m p c / )} /( ) ( , / , / max{ = + + . 
It features in thick dashes what the returns would be, 
had the sup
To summarize the interest by the supermarket in 
such organization of production is double. Not only by 
bundling both tasks the supermarket will reduce the 
motivation costs but also it can endorse monitoring as 
a rent extraction mechanism. 
Finally, this Proposition provides insights on a focal 
issue in the empirical literature on supermarkets, 
namely the fate of small farmers in the emergence of 
these agroindustrial companies. 
From panel (a), it seems clear that the supermarket 
has a preference for well-capitalized farmers. As 
previously explained, when misbehaving, relatively 
wealthy farmers lose their initial outlay  A and this is 
sufficient to keep them on their toes and insure their 
diligence. With lower initial outlays, poorer farmers 
stand to lose less from shirking, and the supermarket 
must insure diligence by relying relatively more on 
incentive payments, which are costly. This result 
provides argument for the empirical literature 
describing the emergence of supermarkets in 
developing countries, which has forcefully argued that 
supermarkets tend to contract with large, wealthy 
farmers, while poorer farmers are left behind (see for 
ermarket behaved like a social surplus 
maximizer.  
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instance, Dolan and Humphrey 2000 and Dolan, 
Humphrey and Harris-Pascal 2001). 
Panel (b) shows that even though the supermarket 
designs the contract, some farmers do obtain a positive 
surplus from their business relationship with the 
supermarket. For the reasons explained above, this, in 
fact, benefits less capitalized farmers. Therefore, the 
existence of strictly positive rents should attract more 
farmers. In fact, the long waiting list to enter into the 
supermarket procurement system observed in many 
developing countries is at least consistent with this 
result (on this issue, see [4]). If we speculate that a 
supermarket tries to extend its grower base, then the 
upper hand of the poorest farmers (i.e., those with 
level of finance such that  ) should benefit 
from the implementation of the supermarket 
arrangement. These findings also seem consistent with 
recent empirical evidence ([16]). 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
To conclude the paper, we discuss the robustness of 
the results with respect to some special assumptions. 
Bargaining power in the hand of the farmers. 
Thus far we have assumed that the supermarket in the 
contractual relationship holds all the bargaining 
power. In the opposite case where the farmers hold all 
the bargaining power, while the distribution of the 
project net returns will be different, the same 
organization of production will be chosen. Access to 
credit was determined by farmers’ pledgeable income, 
which in turns was determined by the incentive 
constraint of each agent. Whether the bargaining 
power is in the hand of the supermarket or the farmers 
will have not effect on the incentive constraint of each 
agent. Hence irrespective of who holds the bargaining 
power an organization of production where the same 
agent performs the task of monitoring and advising 
will maximize the number of farmers having access to 
credit. 
Convex motivation costs. Motivation costs are 
linear in the number of tasks performed -i.e. for the 
procurement agent the cost of monitoring and advising 
is simply the sum of his cost for each task ( c m+ ). If 
instead the relationship between the motivation costs 
and the number of tasks performed was convex, it may 
still be optimal for the supermarket to charge the 
procurement agent with both tasks of advising and 
monitoring. Of course if the raise in motivation costs 
outweighs the effect of the rent reduction associated 
with the bundling of monitoring and advising, then the 
supermarket may prefer an organization of production 
which leaves the task of monitoring and advising in 
the hands of separate agent. 
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